Archive for the 'The Biosphere' Category

Can of Worms

Jonathan Rowe on Mar 14th 2010

I opened a can of philosophical worms with the idea that infinite time, infinite rolls of the dice means human beings will eternally recur in an atheistic universe. Andrew Sullivan linked to it once and then revisited the issue today.

One of the most common criticisms is “we do not know if either space or time is in fact ‘infinite’” as one of Sullivan’s readers put it.

I agree with this and, personally, do NOT assume time is infinite on both ends. My atheist, astronomer, interlocutor does. Continue Reading »

Filed in The Belfry, The Biosphere | 48 responses so far

Abortions for Some

Jason Kuznicki on Jan 25th 2010

My sense is that where one stands on abortion depends almost entirely on which way one begs the initial question of fetal life. If the fetus is a living human being, then killing it is presumptively wrong. It’s not even a hard question. If the fetus is not a living human being, then this talk of killing it is an absurdity. At any rate, it’s no worse than killing a cow or a pig. Or, contentiously, no worse than killing a tumor.

Put differently, if God were to descend from heaven and say: “Human life begins at conception,” nearly all pro-choicers would shut up in a hurry, and this debate (among others) would be over. But if God were to descend from heaven and say: “I don’t put souls in the damn things until they cut the cord,” pro-lifers would be ashamed of themselves, one would hope, and the debate would be settled in the opposite direction.

The only argument I’m aware of that doesn’t depend on begging the fundamental question is such a monstrosity that I hesitate to repeat it. Yet it’s an appealing monstrosity. For the faint of heart, I’ve put it below the fold. Continue Reading »

Filed in The Belfry, The Biosphere | 44 responses so far

Uplift

Jason Kuznicki on Jan 19th 2010

Richard Chappell of Philosophy Et Cetera writes,

Consider Moe, a relatively intelligent monkey, and his psychological counterpart Hugh, a severely retarded human. Let’s stipulate that, despite their differing species, they are psychological duplicates: they have all the same experiences, thoughts, and feelings. This is at least conceivable. Now suppose we can cognitively enhance just one of them, to turn them into a rational person. Do we have any (non-instrumental) reason to prefer enhancing one of them over the other? Would one of them benefit more, for example, or have a stronger moral ‘claim’ to such treatment?

I had a very strong intuitive reaction to this one. It wasn’t a reaction that came up in the discussion over there. It is, however, below the fold. Continue Reading »

Filed in The Biosphere | 19 responses so far